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Abstract 
Using computer simulation, we investigate the impact of different strategies on the financial 
performance of VCs. We compare simple heuristics such as equal weighting and fast and frugal 
trees with more complex machine learning and regression models and analyze the impact of 
three factors: VC learning, the statistical properties of the investment environment, and the 
amount of information available in a business plan. We demonstrate that the performance of 
decision strategies and the relative quality of decision outcomes change critically between 
environments in which different statistical relationships hold between information contained in 
business plans and the likelihood of financial success. The Equal Weighting strategy is 
competitive with more complex investment decision strategies and its performance is robust 
across environments. Learning only from those plans that the simulated VC invested in, 
drastically reduces the VC’s potential to learn from experience. Lastly, the results confirm that 
decision strategies differ in respect to the impact of added information on the outcomes of 
decisions. Finally, we discuss real-world implications for the practice of VCs and research on VC 
decision making. 
Keywords: decision making, VC, investment, simple heuristics, simulation  
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1. Introduction 
Each year venture capital (VC) funds invest billions of dollars in entrepreneurs and 
companies that seek to commercialize their innovative products and services. VC-backed 
companies receive much needed capital as well as privileged access to financial and commercial 
networks, so being selected by a VC as a portfolio investment is considered by many to be one of 
the keys to success for innovative high growth ventures (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Megginson 
& Weiss, 1991). Yet, only one to three per cent of the hundreds of deals received each year by 
any given VC firm are ultimately selected as portfolio investments (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1985; 
Maier & Walker, 1987; Petty & Gruber, 2011). Given the perceived benefits of receiving VC 
investment combined with the apparent selectivity on the part of the VCs, it is little wonder that 
VC decision making has prompted multiple streams of research. 
The existing research on VC decision making has focused on two main issues, the 
overarching selection process (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Fried & 
Hisrich, 1994) and the criteria used by VCs when evaluating deals (MacMillan et al., 1985; 
Dixon, 1991; Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Hall & Hofer, 1993; Muzyka et al., 1996; Franke et 
al., 2008). Multiple studies have demonstrated that VCs generally rely upon a multi-stage 
screening and evaluation process that is designed to limit information asymmetry while reducing 
the probability of missing a potentially profitable opportunity, thus ultimately maximizing their 
profits (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Hall & Hofer, 1993; Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Gompers, 1998). In 
terms of the actual investment decision, research has repeatedly shown that when forecasting the 
viability of a deal, its relative attractiveness is determined by the VC’s assessment of the many 
associated informational cues or characteristics (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; 
Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). However, although different VCs 
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appear to engage in the same selection process and focus on the same general categories of cues 
when evaluating deals, all VCs do not necessarily employ the same forecasting and decision 
making strategies when assessing the potential profitability of deals and ultimately selecting 
portfolio investments (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992; Muzyka et al., 1996; Shepherd, 1999a; Shepherd 
& Zacharakis, 2002). Hoffman, one of the pioneering researchers in the field, concluded that 
“VCs are likely to differ substantially in their investment propensity and practices to the same set 
of investment situations” (1972, p.182). 
However, two research questions central to VC decision making have received only 
limited attention in the literature: (1) how do different decision making strategies impact the 
VC’s overall performance, and (2) what are the factors that influence how well VCs can learn 
from outcome feedback. These issues are of particular importance in the VC context given the 
failure rates of new ventures and the varying rates of returns of VC investment portfolios 
(Sahlman, 1990; Mason & Harrison, 2002; Dimov & De Clercq, 2006). The objective of this 
paper is to estimate the relative effectiveness of different decision making strategies which may 
be employed by a VC while at the same time accounting for the impact of learning when 
screening and selecting deals over the life of a fund. This goal is achieved by means of computer 
simulations in which the relation between the variables describing a business plan and the 
success probability of this plan is systematically manipulated. 
 
2. Related Literature 
A recurring theme in the VC decision making literature over the past forty years has been 
the attempt to identify the informational cues that VCs deem to be relevant when reviewing an 
investment proposal or a business plan. Specifically, researchers have endeavored to develop lists 
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or categories of the key cues and then determine how these cues are used by the VC to evaluate 
and select, or more commonly reject, an investment proposal (Hoffman, 1972; MacMillan et al., 
1985; Robinson, 1987; Muzyka et al., 1996; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2004). As a result, a multitude of cues have been recorded and there is general agreement 
between researchers that these cues can be grouped within the following broad categories: (a) 
product characteristics, (b) market characteristics, (c) a company’s financial position and 
outlook, (d) the traits of the entrepreneur or management team, and (e) other cues such as the 
interest of another VC in a business plan under consideration or the ability of a VC to add value 
to a deal (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Muzyka et al., 1996; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000; Petty & 
Gruber, 2011). 
Regardless of how these cues may be listed or arbitrarily grouped, it is important to note 
that there is no corresponding agreement amongst VCs as to which of the cues is considered to 
be the most important when evaluating and selecting a deal (Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Hall & 
Hofer, 1993; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Shepherd, 1999b). In reality, the perceived relative 
significance of any given cue is often context specific and may be influenced by the investment 
climate, characteristics of the VC firm, or the preferences of the individual VC. 
Several experimental studies involving VCs have established that the evaluation of a deal 
is often influenced by idiosyncratic factors such as an indivdual’s intuition, previous industry 
experience, educational background, or investing experience (Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; 
Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000; Franke et al., 2008). However, despite 
being considered experts at selecting high potential deals and spending on average one-third of 
their time screening and evaluating deals (Robinson, 1987), there is little evidence that VCs are 
aware of their underlying decision making strategies. To the contrary, as a result of their 
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performance in a variety of study settings, the ability of VCs to accurately identify successful 
companies has often been called into question by researchers (Khan, 1987; Zacharakis & Meyer, 
1998; Shepherd et al., 2003; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2005). 
Another area that has received little attention is the role of learning and its impact on VC 
investment decision making and firm performance. The few studies that have examined learning 
within VC firms (Chan et al., 1990; Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) have 
focused on contracting and portfolio management activities, which take place after the VC has 
made their investment decision. Unlike existing research, our study focuses on VC learning 
during the pre-investment phase of the process. Unlike the post-investment activities that are 
only performed with the few deals that are selected as portfolio companies, VCs repeatedly 
perform the pre-investment screening routine on each of the thousands of proposals they receive 
and conduct evaluations on hundreds of deals over the life of any given fund (Tyebjee & Bruno, 
1984; Fried & Hisrich, 1994). Existing views of the VC’s selection and evaluation of the cues 
that are used when making investment decisions have been built primarily upon survey and 
experimental design-based studies. As a result, the majority of the research in this stream remains 
cross sectional in design and only indirectly linked to the VC’s combined objective to both 
enhance process efficiency and maximize the firm’s return on investment (ROI) (Gifford, 1997; 
De Clercq & Sapienza, 2005; Shepherd et al., 2005). 
Our simulations provide a comparison of the effectiveness of various forecasting and 
decision making strategies with prescriptive implications for VC decision making. As Herbert 
Simon (e.g. 1955) repeatedly asserted, strategies and environments have to be considered jointly. 
Building on this insight, the notion of ecological rationality (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007; Todd et 
al., 2012) implies that the effectiveness of strategies can only be evaluated in a given context. We 
PICKING PROFITABLE INVESTMENTS 7 
report how well strategies for investment decisions perform in environments that vary along the 
following dimensions: (i) selectivity of outcome information (information about the success or 
failure of a business plan is available for all plans versus only for those plans a VC has invested 
in), (ii) the relative importance of cues, and (iii) the number of cues available to the VC. Note 
that our investigation on the influence of the selectivity of feedback is one of the first that 
addresses this important aspect of learning in VC decision making. 
 
3. Setup 
One way to determine the performance of strategies would be to implement what 
Brunswik (1955) called a representative design (see also Dhami et al., 2004). In the present case 
this would require a randomly drawn set of real business plans, all described on the same set of 
features and with information available about their performance in case these plans had found an 
investor and had been realized. There are two reasons why we did not evaluate the decision 
strategies this way. The first is pragmatic: To the best of our knowledge, such a data set does not 
exist, nor is it likely to be collected and made accessible to academic inquiry in the near future. 
The second reason is of a methodological nature: Even if it existed and were at our disposal, 
simply observing how the strategies fare in a given set of business plans for which we would not 
manipulate anything, would make any causal claims and a systematic study of the dependency of 
strategies’ success on particular information structures impossible. 
In an attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with representative design, 
Hammond (1966) differentiated between the concepts of substantive situational sampling and 
formal situational sampling. The former implements the original idea of representative design by 
focusing on the content of the task and using real stimuli that have been representatively sampled 
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from the environment. The latter, in contrast, permits the construction and presentation of stimuli 
that are representative in terms of the formal informational properties of the environment (i.e., 
number of cues, their values, distribution, inter-correlations, and ecological validities). We 
followed Hammond’s approach and created fictitious business plans that our simulated VCs used 
as input when making their success forecasts and investment decisions. This procedure gave us 
perfect control over the statistical structure within “our” world. It is important to add that the 
statistical properties in this artificial world were informed by the literature and our knowledge of 
the real world, that is, the generation of business plans was based on a set of plausible 
assumptions that had an empirical basis. 
Each of the plans that we generated is associated with a set of k  binary cues 
,1111},,{0000, 321 ki ccccC , and a dichotomous (future) outcome variable which can take the 
values +1 (success or positive return on investment) and -1 (failure or negative return on 
investment). Each cue is probabilistically related to this outcome so that the vector of cue values 
(henceforth, the cue profile) is useful information when it comes to predicting whether a business 
plan will result in success or not. Note that the cues in the present simulations are devoid of any 
semantics, that is, they could include variables specified in the business plan (e.g., experience of 
the management team) or variables describing the broader context (e.g., market characteristics). 
3.1. The Environments 
The term “environment” refers to the set of probabilities used when creating a set of 
business plans. Specifically, an environment is characterized by the following probabilities. Each 
of the possible cue profiles is associated with a probability )( iop C  that it occurs, and with a 
probability )( isp C  that it will be successful, so that knowledge of this set of probabilities is 
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sufficient to determine the probability of success ( s ) for a randomly sampled business plan 
from this environment. 
3.1.1. Cue Weighting Structures 
We were interested in the question whether the performance of deal selection strategies depends 
on how cues differ from each other with respect to their statistical relationships with the outcome variable. 
Therefore, we generated environments in which the cues are equally important when determining out- 
comes, and other environments in which some cues are more important than others. Specifically, the 
outcome is determined by comparing a weighted sum of the cues and a random error component with a 
threshold value. In the Equal Weights environments, all cues are weighed equally. In the Arithmetic 
Weights environments, a constant value is added to cue weights for each subsequent cue in a fixed 
sequence, whereas in the Geometric Weights environments, cue weights in the sequence are multiplied by 
a constant factor. Parameter values and details for generating these environments for different numbers of 
cues are described in Appendix A. 
3.1.2. Overall Success Probability 
In our simulations, we created environments with a predetermined overall success probability. Because 
the individual success probabilities of the various cue profiles are known (see Appendix A), it was 
possible to manipulate the occurrence probabilities of the individual cue profiles such that the resulting 
overall success probability matched the predetermined probability. The details of this procedure are 
described in Appendix B. 
3.2. The Decision Strategies 
Even experts have been shown to have major difficulties when engaging in unaided judgmental 
forecasting (Dawes, 1979; Tetlock, 2005; Burgman et al., 2011). In the present paper, we use simulated 
VCs who execute four well-defined strategies to make these selections. Such a simulation approach 
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removes any noise that humans produce when using strategies unreliably, and hence allows us to 
determine the upper bound of aided decision making. 
Each of the four deal selection strategies we consider in this paper is responsive to experience and 
integrates new information in systematic ways. However, the strategies differ with respect to how 
information about cue profiles is processed and how their parameters are computed from a set of business 
plans for which the cue profiles and outcome information are given. Equal Weighting is an algorithm that 
simply bases the decisions on the number of cue values in a cue profile that point to success. Logistic 
Regression is a procedure to estimate weights in a linear combination of cues, which, in turn, is used to 
make decisions. CART (Breiman et al., 1984) is a tree-building algorithm that is flexible enough to 
produce the same decisions as any other possible strategy for binary cues. The Fast and Frugal Tree 
heuristic (Martignon et al., 2003, 2008) is a tree-building algorithm as well, but it is more restricted in the 
sense that the set of trees it can possibly generate is reduced. Note that each of these strategies needs to 
estimate parameters, which is achieved on the basis of a sample of cue profiles and their associated 
outcome values, henceforth referred to as the learning sample L . 
Equal Weighting combines the principle of unit weighting of cues, as instantiated by Dawes’ Rule (see 
Dawes, 1979; Czerlinski et al., 1999; Hastie & Kameda, 2005) and index methods (see Burgess, 1939; 
Armstrong & Graefe, 2011) and the principle of making identical predictions for sets of objects with the 
same number of positive cue values, as, for example, implemented in the Mapping Model (von Helversen 
& Rieskamp, 2008). Fast and Frugal Trees are simple binary decision trees that look up cue values 
sequentially and that are potentially, depending on the cue value observed, able to make decisions with- 
out consulting further cues. They embody the principle of one-reason decision making and have been 
analyzed and tested in the context of the simple heuristics program Todd et al. (2012). Logistic regression 
and CART are procedures often used in machine learning and classification tasks across disciplines. 
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Ordered with respect to complexity when estimating their parameters, Equal Weighting is the simplest 
strategy, followed by the Fast and Frugal Tree, with Logistic Regression and CART being the most 
complex strategies of the set. The details of their implementation in the present study are specified in 
Appendix C. 
3.3. The Learning Task: The Standard Condition and Its Variations 
3.3.1. The Standard Condition 
In this paper, we simulated a number of VCs over the period of one fund. During the life of a fund, 
four VCs were confronted sequentially with 102  randomly generated business plans. The four VCs 
differed with respect to which of the four forecasting and deal selection strategies described above they 
used to make their 102  investment decisions. A given condition, which was defined by a particular set of 
parameter combinations (described below), was realized 100 times, corresponding to 100 different sets of 
102  randomly generated business plans. Each of these different sets was shown to new VCs, so that none 
of the simulated VCs could use knowledge from a previous fund. 
The following properties define what we refer to as the standard condition that we use as a reference 
point when presenting the results of the simulation: Each VC started with an experience base of 62  
business plans with known cue profiles and outcome information, generated by the same process as the 
102  plans for which the VCs had to make their investment decisions. When learning its parameter values 
from the experience base before starting a new fund, each deal selection strategy used the same 62  plans. 
In the standard condition, each business plan was characterized by eight cues and their values, and all this 
information was given, without any cue reading errors, to the VCs. The plans were randomly generated 
using the arithmetic cue weighting structure displayed in Table 2 and an overall success probability  
.2=s . 
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For each of the 102  business plans in a given fund, the VC had to decide whether or not to invest an 
arbitrarily chosen investment unit (the same for each investment). After a feedback lag of 62  plans 
(reflecting the fact that feedback on whether or not a business succeeds is usually delayed, Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 2002), the business plan’s cue profile and its outcome was added to the VC’s experience base 
regardless of the investment decision. Each time a profile was added to this experience base, all strategies 
estimated their parameters again as described above and without any bias. An investment decision for any 
of these plans led to a return of 150% of the investment unit if the business was successful, and to its 
complete loss if it failed.1 
 
3.3.2. Variations 
Taking the standard condition as a starting point, we manipulated a number of parameters. In this paper 
we focus on three parameters that we considered to be most interesting and for which we report the 
effects below: First, the selectivity of the feedback relates to the question of whether feedback on the 
outcome variable was provided for all plans or only for those in which a VC actually invested, resulting in 
a biased sample (compare Denrell, 2003). Second, the cue weighting structure (as described in Table 2) 
determined how predictive the cues were relative to each other (Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). Third, the 
number of cues specified how many pieces of information the strategies had at their disposal when 
making decisions (Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). 
In addition, we manipulated a number of other factors: Overall success probability (Chrisman et al., 
1989; Shepherd, 1999b), financial consequences of success and failure (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1986; Gompers 
& Lerner, 2001), size of the expertise base (Shepherd et al., 2003; Franke et al., 2008), delay of outcome 
                                                 
1
This translates into .5=iso , 1= ifo , 0=nso , and 0=nfo , and 
3
2
= , see Appendix C. 
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feedback (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Harvey & Fischer, 2005), amount of error in determining success 
(Khan, 1987; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). These manipulations served as a sensitivity analysis and their 
effects were either minor or intuitive. More importantly, these robustness checks revealed that our major 
results seem not to hinge on specific parameter constellations, therefore specific results are not reported 
here. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. The Standard Condition 
The main measure we use to evaluate the behavior and the monetary performance of the strategies is 
the accumulated profit, that is, the total ROI after the first k  investments. Note that the number of 
investments should not be confused with the number of encountered plans. This difference is important as 
the decision strategies differ with respect to how many investments were made for a given number of 
presented plans, or, conversely, how many plans were presented before making k  investments. If the fund 
closed before k  investments were made, then the profit for k  investments was defined as the profit that 
had accumulated at the time the fund closed. 
Figure 1 displays the profit of the strategies after k  investments, averaged across the 100 simulated 
funds, for the parameter configuration that we defined as the standard condition. 
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Figure 1: Return after k investments in the standard condition 
 
The curves, except for the Fast and Frugal Tree, have similar shapes and can be divided 
into four distinct phases. In the first phase, the learning phase, profit gradually increased with the 
number of investments, reflecting the fact that VCs refined their parameters and continued to 
benefit from a growing experience base. In the second phase, the informed phase, the slope (i.e., 
the average difference with respect to accumulated return) remains relatively stable, reflecting 
the fact that the parameter estimates no longer changed substantially as new feedback was 
obtained (which amounts to saying that VCs were relatively well informed about their 
environment). In the fourth phase, the slope finally approaches zero, reflecting the fact that – by 
the time the fund was closed (i.e., after 102  plans) – each VC had made a certain number of 
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investments ( im ) and the VC’s profit is defined to be constant for any imk > . In the intermediate 
third phase, the slope smoothly decreases, reflecting the fact that the curve for a given strategy is 
aggregated over 100 funds, each managed by a different VC with a distinct im . Had we used 
twice as many plans, the learning phase would have looked exactly the same, the informed phase 
would have lasted more than twice as long (because there would be no necessity to start learning 
from scratch), and the final profit would have been more than twice as high (because the 
informed phase, during which profit is higher compared to the learning phase, would have lasted 
more than twice as long). 
The Equal Weighting strategy had the shortest learning phase, ending at approximately 5–
20 investments, and the highest slope during the informed phase. CART started negative while 
learning but was able to recover and to make positive profits. Still, it was less profitable than 
Equal Weighting and Logistic Regression, and it never reached their final level of profits. The 
Fast and Frugal Tree did not make any profit at any time. 
Table 1 provides some additional information about the behavior and performance of the 
strategies in the standard condition. The measures introduced in this table correspond to the 
phases that we identified in Figure 1. The first data column reports the average return per 
investment computed over the first 25 investments ( 251ROI ). If a VC made less than 25 
investments, this VC’s investments were still included in the analysis. As Figure 1 shows, some 
strategies had a learning phase longer than 25 investments, but it also seems to be the case that 
none of them had completed learning before this point. Equal Weighting, which had the shortest 
learning phase, also made the most profit during this phase. 
The second data column reports the return averaged across the 25 investments between 
the 51st and 75th ( 7551ROI ). Again, not every VC contributed 25 data points to the analysis. As 
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Figure 1 shows, this period falls into the informed phase of Equal Weighting and the Regression 
strategy, while it seems to be at the very beginning of CART’s informed phase. And again, Equal 
Weighting performed the best. 
The next data column in Table 1 reports the average return across all investment 
decisions made by the VCs using a given strategy ( allROI ). The next four data columns report 
how many investments the 100 simulated VCs who used a given strategy made across the 210 
plans. First, the variance and the range of this number (across the VCs who used the same 
strategy) were quite large. Second, the difference between the strategies with respect to the mean 
number of investments that VCs made was also considerable. The entries for the minimal and 
maximal number of investments roughly mark when the slope during the informed phase starts to 
decrease and when it approaches zero, respectively. Even though Equal Weighting had a higher 
slope during its informed phase, VCs who used this strategy invested, on average, less than those 
using Regression. As a consequence, the curves cross and Equal Weighting ended up with a 
lower final return (see Table 1, last two columns). 
 
Table 1: Results for the Standard Condition. 
 
 
 
The performance of the strategies, as summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1, can be related 
to the cue weighting structure. In the present environment with its linear and compensatory set of 
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weights (arithmetic cue weighting structure, see Table 2), neither of the two tree algorithms was 
competitive. The Fast and Frugal Tree did not find the single cue that is valid enough for one-
reason decision making, simply because this cue did not exist. CART, in contrast, has the 
potential to deal with an arithmetic cue weighting structure, but this requires the construction of a 
complex tree with a high number of nodes, which, in turn, requires an extended experience base. 
Note that at a given stage during the construction of the tree, the business plans are distributed 
over its end nodes and a small sample of plans prevents these end nodes from being split up 
further. Even though Equal Weighting does not match the weighting structure in the present 
environment, its ability to make robust inferences Dawes (1979) was able to compensate for this 
mismatch – at least to such an extent that it was able to outperform the Logistic Regression. 
4.2. Selectivity of Feedback 
In the standard condition, the VCs could include all business plans in their experience 
base, no matter whether they had decided to invest or not to invest. While it is of vital 
importance to monitor the success or failure of business plans a VC invested in, such information 
about plans that a VC rejected is often not available – be it because outcome information did not 
reach the VC after a different investor funded the unmodified proposal, or because no other 
investor has been found and the business hence failed to materialize (Bruno & Tyebjee, 1986). A 
high confidence in one’s ability to make good investment decisions, eventually coupled with the 
belief that outcome information about rejected proposals is irrelevant, may lower the motivation 
to actively search for such (potentially costly) information. 
The biased sampling of business plans creates a situation in which the set of plans that 
VCs encounter cannot be considered to be a representative sample of the business plans in the 
population. The psychological literature is rich in examples demonstrating that performance is 
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severely impaired due to such a sample selection bias (see Brunswik, 1955; Fiedler, 2000; Dhami 
et al., 2004). 
To see how this bias affects investment results, we also created a condition in which the 
simulated VCs were only able to include in their learning sample those business plans they 
invested in (note that this reduction of feedback was only implemented after the fund started, but 
it did not affect the experience base that VCs were equipped with before they started to make 
decisions). The results are displayed in Figure 2. As the comparison between this figure and that 
of the standard condition shows, all strategies perform worse if the feedback was selective – be it 
because the size of the learning sample was smaller, or because the learning sample was biased, 
or both. 
Even though the order of the four strategies with respect to their profit was the same for 
both learning conditions, there are some striking differences. The strategy that was most affected 
by restricting the learning sample was CART: As in the standard condition, the slope starts out 
negative, but when information on rejected business plans was lacking, this strategy was not able 
to enter an informed phase in which the constructed trees could make substantial profits, and, as 
a consequence, also not able to compensate for the losses made during its learning phase. 
While in the standard condition, Equal Weighting has a slope of about .3 during its 
informed phase (see also Table 1, 7551ROI ), when feedback was selective this slope is reduced 
by roughly 20% to about .24. Note that slopes of .3 and .24 correspond to 86.6% and 82.7% 
successful outcomes among business plans that received funding, respectively, which should be 
compared to the a priori success probability of .2. For Logistic Regression the slope was reduced 
from about .25 by roughly 28% to about .18, corresponding to 83.3% and 78.7% of successful 
outcomes among all investment decisions. Thus, not only did Equal Weighting have a higher 
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slope than Logistic Regression in both feedback conditions, it also suffered less when outcome 
information on rejected plans no longer entered the learning sample; that is, it was more robust 
when sample selection bias was introduced. To put the absolute effect between unselected and 
selected feedback received during the informed phase in context, note that a drop in profits of .06 
(Equal Weighting; from .3 to .24) and .07 (Logistic Regression; from .25 to .18) is still more than 
10% of the profit for a successful deal, which was .5 investment units. 
 
 
Figure 2: Return after k investments while learning from investments only 
 
The drop in performance due to selectivity of outcome feedback for three of the four 
strategies can also be seen when considering allROI . For Equal Weighting, Logistic Regression, 
PICKING PROFITABLE INVESTMENTS 20 
CART, and the Fast and Frugal Tree, ( allROI ) was .21, .16, .00 and -.44, respectively, when 
feedback was selective. Comparing these values to the last column of Table 1 (where feedback 
was given for all plans), the drop in performance due to this manipulation was 
roughly .06, .05, .11 for the first three strategies. The Fast and Frugal Tree improved by 
roughly .08, while the allROI stayed negative. 
4.3. The Cue Weighting Structure 
For the standard condition, we used arithmetic cue weights when generating business 
plans. As explained in the Setup section, we also generated business plans for which the cues 
were equally predictive (equal weights), or for which their weights adhered to a geometric 
distribution (see Table 2). We reran the standard condition except that we used business plans 
generated with the arithmetic and geometric cue weighting structure. The performance of the 
strategies in the two new environments is shown in Figure 3. It is evident that the relative success 
of the four strategies depends on the environment in which they are tested. 
In the Arithmetic Weights Environment, and especially in the Equal Weights 
Environment, Equal Weighting was the best strategy (in terms of average return on investment 
during the informed phase). In the Geometric Weights Environment, Equal Weighting was the 
worst performing strategy, while in contrast, the Fast and Frugal Tree, which had failed in the 
Equal Weights Environment, now performed best, almost converging against the theoretically 
optimal slope of .5. CART, which had shown the worst performance during the learning phase 
and the second worst performance during the informed phase in the other two environments, 
showed virtually the same (good) performance as Logistic Regression in the Geometric Weights 
Environment. 
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For the Equal Weighting strategy, the average number of investments did not vary much 
between the environments (94.4, 92.9, and 82.7 for Equal Weights, Arithmetic Weights and 
Geometric Weights, respectively). In contrast, both for the Logistic Regression (127.8, 157.7, 
and 181.6, respectively) and for CART (126.0, 147.1, and 182.0), this number increased as the 
skewness of the distribution of cue weights increased (note that a higher skew made it easier to 
identify what the predictive cues in the environment were). The difference was most pronounced 
for the Fast and Frugal Tree which made, on average, 2.5 investments in the Equal Weights 
Environment, 2.0 in the Arithmetic Weights Environment, and 103.8 in the Geometric Weights 
Environment. 
The cue weighting structure turns out to be a crucial factor in the study of the ecological 
rationality of strategies: a strategy tended to perform well if its architecture matched the 
properties of the environment (here, the cue weighting structure). Equal Weighting excelled in an 
environment in which the cues were equally predictive, but in the Geometric Weights 
Environment in which the distribution of cue weights is highly skewed, this strategy was 
punished for using a non-matching weighting structure. Treating some cues as more important 
than others (as Fast and Frugal Trees do in the extreme) makes sense only if some cues are 
indeed more important than others in the respective environment. Therefore, it showed the 
opposite pattern compared to Equal Weighting. Martignon et al. (2008, Result 2) have shown that 
each linear threshold model with non-compensatory weights shows the same decision behavior 
as a corresponding Fast and Frugal Tree using the same (or a subset of the) cues used in the 
linear model. Therefore, the Fast and Frugal Tree can match the Geometric Weights Environment 
as the latter can be described as a linear threshold classifier with non-compensatory weights.  
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Figure 3: Return after k investments for the Equal Weights and the Geometric Weights 
Environment 
 
These two examples were extreme in the sense that the two strategies had an extreme 
architectural bias (Equal Weighting is biased towards flat weighting, and the Fast and Frugal 
Tree is biased towards a steep hierarchy) and the two environments had extreme properties (flat 
and highly skewed cue weighting structures). How did the strategies perform in the Arithmetic 
Weights Environment whose cue weighting structure was in between that of the other two 
environments (see Table 2)? Consistent with the title Dawes (1979) used for his classic paper 
(“The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making”), Equal Weighting was 
robust enough to fare well when the cue weights followed an arithmetic structure – and more 
than this, it was even the best performing strategy. In contrast, this cue weighting structure was 
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not skewed enough to allow the Fast and Frugal Tree to realize its potential. As Table 1 shows, 
VCs using this strategy could not construct a tree that led to a substantial number of investments 
and those few investments obtained, on average, a negative return. 
In contrast to Equal Weighting and the Fast and Frugal Tree, the other two strategies 
were, at least in principle, flexible enough to adjust to a wide range of environmental properties. 
One could therefore argue that in the Geometric Environment, CART should be able to match the 
performance of the simpler Fast and Frugal Tree, since the structure of the tree constructed by 
the latter strategy is within CART’s search space. However, this is not necessarily true as the 
larger size of CART’s search space requires a longer learning phase to find the structure of this 
tree (and even with an unlimited learning phase this is not guaranteed). Given the parameters we 
used in our simulations, even though CART’s performance came close to that of the Fast and 
Frugal Tree, it did not reach it (the slope in the informed phase was about 7% lower). CART also 
has the potential to construct trees that match the performance of Equal Weighting. As it turned 
out, however, it struggled in the Arithmetic Weights Environment and even more so in the Equal 
Weights Environment. This can be explained by the fact that the trees necessary to capture the 
cue weighting structures of these environments need to be much larger than those for the 
Geometric Weights Environment – and even CART’s prolonged learning phase for those two 
environments was not sufficient to construct a competitive complex tree. 
In a similar vein, Logistic Regression had the potential to perform well in all three 
environments. It owes its flexibility to the fact that it estimates cue weights without any 
restrictions. Indeed, there is no environment in which VCs using this strategy are heavily 
outperformed. Nevertheless, there is not a single environment that allows Logistic Regression to 
win the competition against all three other strategies. The lack of a stronger bias towards a 
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particular cue weighting structure and the impact of sampling error during the learning phase 
prevents the strategy from finding the cue weights that are optimal for the environment, and 
hence, from reaching the performance that could theoretically be achieved. 
4.4. The Number of Cues 
In the standard condition, a business plan was described by 8 cue values. We manipulated 
this number and set it to be either 6, 8 (standard), 10, or 12. The manipulation of the number of 
cues did not result in a change of the ordering of the strategies, except for the fact that CART’s 
performance decreased (compared to that of the other strategies) as the number of cues 
increased. Figure 4 shows how each of the four strategies was affected by this manipulation. 
The Equal Weighting strategy performed almost the same in the four cue number 
conditions, except that it made more investments as the number of cues increased. For Logistic 
Regression, in contrast, an interesting pattern can be observed: during the learning phase, the 
VCs using this strategy made better decisions when the number of cues was smaller, whereas this 
relationship was reversed when considering the informed phase. In addition to the resulting 
crossing of the return curves, it can be observed that the learning phase was longer and the 
number of investments was higher when more cues were available. For CART, the curves do not 
cross and in each phase, this strategy both made fewer investments and performed better when 
the number of cues was smaller. Finally, the inability of the Fast and Frugal Tree to cope with an 
Arithmetic Weights Environment (that we described above for the standard condition) was robust 
against this manipulation, except that performance was worse for smaller numbers of cues. 
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Figure 4: Return after k investments for different numbers of cues 
 
These results again demonstrate how important it is to consider strategies and 
environments jointly (Todd et al., 2012). The performance of a strategy can only be determined 
in a given environment and strategies’ performance can be affected differentially by changes of 
environmental features. Whereas the number of cues (almost) did not affect Equal Weighting and 
the Fast and Frugal Tree, CART and Logistic Regression performed differently in the various cue 
number conditions. For CART, the effect of the number of cues is readily explained: the strategy 
obviously found it easier to construct a well performing tree when the number of cues (and, 
hence, the universe of possible trees) was smaller. For Logistic Regression, it is easier to estimate 
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the parameters when the number of cues is smaller (hence the shorter learning phase for a 
smaller numbers of cues), but once the strategy is in the informed phase and estimates are 
relatively stable, the strategy benefits if more information can be processed. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
One of our central simulation results was that the Equal Weighting strategy was 
competitive with more complex investment decision strategies. This finding is consistent with a 
general pattern found across a wide range of tasks and domains: Under specific conditions, 
simple strategies can outperform complex strategies, presumably not despite of their simplicity 
but because of it (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002). Specifically, their success when deciding upon 
new business plans can largely be attributed to the robustness of their parameter estimates (see 
also Dawes, 1979). Complex strategies have an advantage when it comes to fitting known data. 
This was not the situation, however, in the present set of simulations, neither is it a relevant 
condition for VCs who will have to make investment decisions for new business plans outside 
the learning sample, in particular, if this learning sample is small. In such a situation, simple 
strategies that are adapted to the environmental structure will prevail. For instance, when 
Armstrong & Graefe (2011) compared forecasting methods in the context of the last 29 U.S. 
presidential elections, they found that an equal weighting model based on 59 biographical 
variables of presidential candidates (which they called “index method”) outperformed – in cross-
validation – Gallup polls, prediction markets, and three respectable econometric models. 
Moreover, they found that a model based on this bio-index was competitive with seven 
econometric models in forecasting voting shares (see also Graefe, this issue). 
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In a similar vein, Gigerenzer & Brighton (2009) showed for small learning samples that a 
lexicographic decision strategy outperformed several more complex strategies in a wide range of 
conditions (see also Brighton & Gigerenzer, this issue), von Helversen & Rieskamp (2008) 
demonstrated that a simple strategy which used equal weighting of predictors outperformed 
multiple regression in an estimation task, and DeMiguel et al. (2009) demonstrated that the 
simple 1/N heuristic that allocated wealth equally across N assets could not be consistently 
outperformed by any of the optimizing allocation model that they used as benchmarks. Goldstein 
& Gigerenzer (2009) offer a more extensive evaluation of simple forecasting strategies. They 
demonstrate the successful performance of simple prediction rules in tasks as diverse as portfolio 
selection, the prediction of future customer purchase activity and future high-value customers, 
the forecasting of tennis and soccer results, and the forensic practice of geographic crime 
profiling. 
Our results are in line with these findings: The performance of the simple Equal 
Weighting strategy was robust across environments in the sense that it either outperformed the 
other strategies (in Arithmetic and Equal Weights Environments) or did not lag much behind the 
winner (in a Geometric Weights Environment). VCs who do not know the statistical structure of 
the environment are thus well-advised to use this simple and robust strategy as a starting point 
and may, after a substantial number of investments followed by outcome information, consult 
and carefully evaluate the experience base to check whether the millions or billions they have at 
their disposal should better be invested by adapting a different plan for making investment 
decisions. 
Our findings are also consistent with the notion of ecological rationality (Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007), and demonstrate how important it is to consider strategies and environments 
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jointly: (i) The performance of a strategy can only be determined within the context of a given 
environment and (ii) strategies’ performance can be differentially affected by changes of 
environmental features. Building on these observations, VCs are well advised to learn more 
about their environment. Different VCs are likely to operate in environments with different 
statistical structures, in other words, there will be variance across time, regions, markets and fund 
sizes. While our simulations used parameter ranges that were informed by the real world, VCs 
need to know which parameter constellation is relevant for them in particular. 
Consequently, VCs may gain a competitive advantage from systematically studying their 
decision making context, for instance, by using the information stored in their archives, or, even 
better, by creating protocols that allow for convenient forms of data analysis. In this learning 
process VCs should, however, consider that learning from outcomes of their own investments 
alone may lead to biased parameter estimates for the decision strategies, as our simulations have 
shown – simply because the amount of decision making experience, and learning as a result of 
the same, by any VC is too limited to enable them to estimate cue weights with enough precision 
to apply the model. The consideration of their own investments should thus be complemented by 
securing other information sources to obtain a more complete representation of the statistical 
properties of their environment. 
While the vast majority of research on VC decision making has focused more on the 
VCs’ assessment of specific cues, our focus was on the performance of forecasting and deal 
selection strategies that differ with respect to how they process cues. Similarly, Zacharakis & 
Meyer (2000) used two bootstrapping models to predict the success of ventures and compared 
the performance of these models to that of actual VCs (see also Armstrong, 2001). Their first 
model used cue weights that were fitted to data from an earlier study and their second model 
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weighted the cues equally. The authors found that the equally weighted bootstrap model was 
clearly better at selecting successful ventures than both the alternative model and the actual VCs. 
They conclude that bootstrap models are useful decision aids for VCs – a conclusion that we 
fully endorse (see also Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2002). 
Our Equal Weighting strategy outperformed more complex strategies in two of the three 
types of environments we analyzed. Zacharakis and Meyer’s bootstrap model with weights that 
have been fitted to earlier data corresponds to the Logistic Regression strategy in our simulation 
with regression weights that have been fitted to the VC’s experience base. Thus, in both studies 
the Equal Weighting strategy is more robust and hence more useful than the regression model 
when it comes to forecasting the success of previously unseen business plans. 
Similarly, Ǻstebro & Elhedhli (2006) found that a simple conjunctive model with 
separate counts for good and bad cues also turned out to be extremely successful when modeling 
experts’ forecasts of early-stage ventures’ performance. They concluded that “simple decision 
heuristics can perform well in a natural and very difficult decision-making context” (p. 395). 
In the real world, VCs may provide value-added activities to their portfolio companies 
that will enhance their performance (Sapienza et al., 1994; Cumming et al., 2005). Also, during 
times of increased VC investment activity or in the case of an exceptionally promising proposal, 
VCs are often forced to compete for the opportunity to invest in selected deals (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001; Lockett & Wright, 2001). While we have not explicitly considered these factors so 
far, our simulations do allow for their inclusion. In the first instance, when evaluating a deal a 
VC will be assessing the need for, as well as their ability to provide, any necessary hands-on 
involvement or other value-added activities. As such, the perceived potential for the VC to 
provide support for a deal beyond the financial investment can be one of the cues that are 
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evaluated by a VC. Secondly, the actions of another VC interested in a potential deal, either 
observed directly by the focal VC or reported by the entrepreneur or a third party, can be one of 
the cues that are used in our simulations. 
The decision strategies we have studied are described in a way that will assist future 
researchers further the scope of empirical testing in the VC setting. The literature to date has 
provided many valuable insights on the content and process aspects of the core VC activities but 
has predominantly provided descriptive accounts that offer limited input to the VC community. 
Our work builds upon this body of research and evaluates the VC investment decision task 
through a more prescriptive approach. Moreover, in our simulations the term VC may represent 
an individual VC or a team of VCs within a firm so we hope that our findings will provide the 
basis for more successful investment decision strategies, at both the individual and firm levels. 
Finally, we believe that this paper can serve as a basis for more longitudinal research that focuses 
on the intersection of the weighting of informational cues, the forecasting and decision making 
process, and VC performance and learning. 
Extending beyond the VC context, our simulations are equally relevant to angel 
investment networks, the managers of corporate venture funds and private equity funds. 
Although each of these investors has their own unique preferences and investment objectives, 
they all seek profitable deals and draw upon multiple informational cues when evaluating 
potential investment opportunities. Additionally, we believe that our results will inform others 
who engage in evaluation and selection routines such as human resource professionals or any 
manager responsible for selecting job candidates. Given the robustness of the pattern obtained in 
our own simulation and in the related research discussed above, we predict that simple strategies 
for forecasting and for decision making will prevail in these domains as well. 
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Appendix A: The cue weighting structures 
5.1. Eight cues 
Whether a business plan with a given cue profile has a positive or negative outcome 
value ( 1=)( if C  vs. 1=)( if C ) is determined by comparing the value of 
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where iw  are cue weights as specified below and ǫ is a random variable (whose values 
are drawn from a uniform distribution over ];[ ee , where the parameter constant e  represents the 
amount of uncertainty), with a threshold   : 
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The probability for each cue profile to be associated with a positive outcome value is 
therefore determined as follows: 
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Table 2: Parameters for the Standard Condition. 
   
 
The weights jw  in Equation 1 together with the threshold and error define the relative 
importance of cues. The ordered set of weights conforms to one of three different types of 
sequences, namely, constant, arithmetic, and geometric. Given that a constant sequence of 
weights corresponds to a set of equal weights, we will henceforth use the following terminology 
for the three types of cue weighting structures: 
1. Equal: The weights are all set to 1=iw . 
2. Arithmetic: The weights are determined by 
1
22
1)(=



k
s
iswi . The parameter 
2<<1 s  determines the highest weight ( s ) and the lowest weight ( s2 ). 
3. Geometric: The weights are determined by 121=
 ii ssw . The parameter 0>1s
determines the largest weight, the parameter 1<<0 2s  determines the ratio 
between subsequent weights. 
 
5.2. Different numbers of cues 
For different numbers of cues, the weights of the cues had to be adapted in order to still 
be able to satisfy the constraints imposed by the cue weighting structure (for the Arithmetic 
Weights Environment 
1
22
1)(=



k
s
iswi ). The maximum and the minimum cue weight as 
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well as the size of the error component were kept constant, only the threshold was increased by 
one for every two cues that were added. The resulting cue weighting structures are displayed in 
Table 3 (for the Arithmetic Weights Environment). 
 
Table 3: Parameters for cue number variations (rounded to two decimal places). 
 
 
Appendix B: Calculation of occurrence probabilities 
The following procedure was used to determine occurrence probabilities for cue profiles 
in a way that guaranteed the predetermined overall success probability s . In a first step, each 
profile was assigned to one of three classes ( 
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probabilities for cue profiles are then determined by 
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ensuring that the overall success probability for a set of business plans with these occurrence 
probabilities is at the predetermined level. 
 
Appendix C: Implementation of Algorithms 
Implementation of Equal Weighting 
Equal Weighting is based on the number of cues whose values predict success. 
Specifically, the learning sample is first used to determine, for each cue, which cue value, if any, 
is associated with a higher percentage of successful plans. Equal Weighting then counts, for a 
given cue profile iC , the number )( iw C  of cues whose values point to success. All observed cue 
profiles that share the same w(Ci ) are grouped into one class, for which it is determined whether 
it is better to invest or not. This, of course, depends on the financial consequences of investment 
decisions, specifically on the outcomes for successes after decisions to invest ( iso ), failures after 
decisions to invest ( ifo ), successes after decisions not to invest ( nso ), and failures after decisions 
not to invest ( nfo ). 
 The fraction 
nsisifnf
ifnf
oooo
oo


= represents the relationship of the consequences 
incurred by decisions concerning plans that fail and plans that succeed: If a plan fails, the 
difference between not investing and investing into the plan is ifnf oo  . If a plan succeeds, the 
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difference between investing and not investing is nsis oo  . These differences reflect the financial 
impact of a correct versus false decision for unsuccessful and successful plans, respectively. The 
fraction   will have values between 0 and 1, with this value being close to 1 when the impact of 
investment decisions (invest versus not invest) for successful plans is negligible when compared 
to the corresponding impact for unsuccessful plans. Conversely, the value of τ is close to 0 when 
the impact of investment decisions for unsuccessful plans is negligible compared to the 
corresponding impact for successful plans. A value of .5 represents a situation where the two 
impacts of decisions for successful and unsuccessful plans are the same. In this situation, a VC 
can gain as much from investing in a successful plan relative to not investing as the VC can lose 
from investing in an unsuccessful plan relative to not investing. If Equal Weighting is used in this 
case, then it is sufficient to determine the fraction of successful and unsuccessful business plans 
in memory within the class defined by )( iw C and follow the majority in the sense that an 
investment is made, whenever the majority of plans within this class is successful. In the general 
case, whether an investment is made or not is based on 
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Whenever 1=)( iD C , the decision is made to invest in iC  and one investment unit is 
immediately invested. When 1=)( iD C , the decision is made not to invest in the business plan. 
Finally, when 0=)( iD C , one of the two decisions is selected randomly with equal probabilities. 
This procedure ensures that, at least for the set of cue profiles in L  with identical value of w , the 
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most profitable decision (invest or not invest) is chosen if it exists (based on the assumption that 
the business plans in memory are representative of the population, of course). 
Implementation of Logistic Regression 
The dependent variable is not directly regressed onto the predictors, rather the probability 
of being associated with a positive outcome value ( ip ) is estimated for each profile. Because ip
can only take values within the interval [0;1] , ip  is replaced by the so-called link function 
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1
=)(  which can take values in the interval [;]  . This log-odds-ratio is, in 
turn, regressed onto the predictors in the form jji
k
ji
cplogit   1=0=)( . 
In this sense, a Logistic Regression involves nonetheless a linear combination of 
predictor values. Unlike in OLS regression, the predictors are estimated via a maximum 
likelihood estimation algorithm (see Agresti, 2002). In the present simulation, Matlab’s “glmfit” 
procedure was used for this task. The probability of success for a given business plan that is 
estimated by Logistic Regression ( ipˆ ) is then compared to the ratio of potential losses and gains, 
similar to the procedure described above for Equal Weighting: 
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Again, the decision to invest or not to invest is based solely on )( iD C , following the 
same procedure that is explained above for Equal Weighting. 
Implementation of CART 
CART (Breiman et al., 1984) is an algorithm to develop binary trees (i.e., trees in which 
each node has either two or zero child nodes) without a priori constraints pertaining to the tree 
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structure. CART uses a binary recursive partitioning algorithm for creating a binary decision-tree 
structure. The process starts by creating the root node that contains the total set of business plans 
of L. If and only if this number of plans is above a predefined threshold (in our implementation, 
10), two child nodes are created from this root node. Each of the (dichotomous) attributes that 
describe a plan can be used to assign a plan to one of the child nodes. CART chooses the 
attribute that maximizes the homogeneity of the resulting subgroups with respect to the outcome 
(technically, this is achieved by minimizing the GINI’s diversity index). Each child node that 
results from this process will, in turn, be used as a new parent node, and the procedure described 
above will be applied to it and to any further child nodes. This procedure continues until no 
further splits are possible, which is the case if all end nodes either contain less than 10 cases, or 
contain business plans with only one outcome. A given end node is associated with the decision 
(namely, to invest or not) that maximizes the profit that results from applying this decision to all 
plans that are contained in this node. In our simulation, Matlab’s standard “treefit” procedure was 
used to implement CART. 
Implementation of Fast and Frugal Trees 
Fast and frugal trees are a class of binary classification trees that are structurally 
constrained in the following way (see Martignon et al., 2008, for a formal treatment of fast and 
frugal trees). Following the root node there is exactly one end node at every level, except for the 
last level, which has two end nodes. Therefore, a tree with m  levels (including the root node) has 
12 m nodes. On each level, exactly one cue is considered. Depending on the cue value, either an 
end node is reached or information processing continues down the tree by looking up 
information on another cue. If the cue value leads to an end node, then an investment decision is 
made, be it to invest or not to invest. Thus, fast and frugal trees exemplify one-reason decision 
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making. Moreover, it is a non-compensatory strategy because once an end node is reached, no 
further information is processed and the decision associated with this end node cannot be 
changed (see Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002). 
In a simulation involving 30 empirical data sets, Martignon et al. (2008) compared 
various algorithms to construct such fast and frugal trees. In the present paper, a variant of the 
winner in their competition is used, henceforth referred to as the Fast and Frugal Tree. Its 
structure is constrained such that the decisions associated with the end nodes on subsequent 
levels alternate between investing and non-investing. Within this structure, cues are ordered 
according to their usefulness to either correctly identify successful or unsuccessful business plans 
– depending on whether the current level demands that an investment or non-investment decision 
should be made. This structure helps to protect against all cases being classified in the same way. 
In some environments enforcing such a balance may exact a price, specifically, if the base rate of 
successful plans is either very high or very low, or if the two misclassification costs are highly 
dissimilar. To mitigate such disadvantages, the procedure described above is modified as follows: 
If the base rates of successful and unsuccessful plans are unequal, then a bias is introduced that 
allows to have several end nodes of the same type in sequence.2 In addition, the misclassification 
costs and the observed diagnosticity of cue values determine which cues cannot be utilized as a 
                                                 
2 Let posf represent the fraction of successful plans in the learning sample. If .5>posf
then the first 1
1
2 








 pos
pos
f
f
log  end nodes are linked to decisions to invest, and if .5<posf then 
the 1
1
2 







 
pos
pos
f
f
log end nodes are linked to decisions not to invest. 
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basis for positive and negative decisions.3 Even though this restriction can lead to a pruned tree 
or, in a more extreme case, to the same default decision for all plans, they prohibit the use of 
cues that make a monetary loss highly probable if decisions are based solely on a single cue 
value. 
 
  
                                                 
3 Any cue, for which the percentage of successful plans among plans with a positive cue 
value in the learning sample is lower than the cost ratio   is excluded from the set of cues that 
could form the basis for a decision to invest. Conversely, any cue for which the percentage of 
unsuccessful plans among plans with a negative cue value in the learning sample lower than 
1 is excluded from the set of cues that could form the basis for a decision not to invest. 
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